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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/07/2011 Accident number: 772 
Accident time: 12:50 Accident Date: 28/06/2005 
Where it occurred: Not recorded, see 
detailed map reference
Country: Sri Lanka 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?) 
Class: Demolition accident Date of main report: 28/06/2005 
ID original source: None Name of source: Demining group 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Fuze Ground condition: agricultural (recent) 
demolition site 
(explosives) 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 19/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: IIMASA Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: 024.05.72 E Map north: 037.29.69 N 
Map scale: Trincomallee Map series: ABMP 
Map edition: 01 Map sheet: 28 
Map name: 1:50000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is an IMSMA “tick-box” 
record. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. 
Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes 
available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
IMSMA record extracts 
1 
Place of accident: field [GPS recorded] 
Cause of accident: “Without knowing the deminer was burning the device which caused the 
detonation.” 
Accident description:  
“On the 28th of June 2005 [Demining group] QRT did a bulk demolition before going on 
stand-down. Most of the ammunition went to high order but 3 grenades went to low order and 
was destroyed by a second demolition. 
After the team had located all metal scrap and rests from the destroyed ammunition by raking 
the whole demolition area and checking inside the broken sandbags that was used as 
protection during the demolition, they started to clean the area from the broken sandbags and 
vegetation. The team started to burn all the collected sandbags and vegetation. 
In one of the sandbags apparently one fuse was stuck after the demolition and was not 
discovered by the deminers when they checked the area after non exploded devices. The 
fuse probably went off by the heat from the fire and injured a deminer in his left arm and in his 
back with small metal pieces. 
The deminer was wearing his protective vest and visor but had his back turned towards the 
fire when the fuse exploded. 
Device: Fuze, unknown. 
Victim wore Protective equipment. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 958 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 34 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 30 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Arm; severe Back 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. Fragmentation injuries, presumed to 
require surgical removal, so "severe". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Unavoidable because it is likely that the Victim 
was working as directed, to approved SOPs, when the accident occurred. The secondary 
cause is listed as Victim Inattention because it is possible that the Victim did not search 
through the debris properly and so missed the fuze.  
2 
When burning demolition debris that may include explosive devices, it is obvious that safety 
distances should be maintained. With no report other than the notoriously inadequate IMSMA 
form, it is not clear whether the demining group drew any conclusions from the accident. They 
may have changed their working methods, which appear to have been questionable.  
IMSMA accident records have always been over-simplified and entirely “Inadequate”  for use 
in determining causes and so deriving any useful lessons from the events. The UN supported 
MAC in Sri Lanka has generally failed to conduct independent investigations and has failed 
(despite requests) to make any available records available to the DDAS, so ignoring the 
requirements of the IMAS. The Demining group involved in this accident is thanked for its 
transparency in making their record available. 
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